, is provided for the method in relation to the IEEE 802.11 a/g standards . Its results prove that maximum steganographic bandwidth for WiPad is as high as 1.1 Mbit/s for data frames and 0.44 Mbit/s for acknowledgment (ACK) frames. To the authors' best knowledge this is the most capacious of all the known steganographic network channels.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we present and evaluate a new information hiding method based on bit padding of OFDM (Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing) symbols at the physical layer (PHY) of IEEE 802.11 networks. Depending on the transmission data rate at the PHY layer the number of encoded bits per symbol spans from 24 up to 216, therefore as many as 27 octets can be embedded in each OFDM symbol. Due to the specific structure of a frame (described in detail in Section III) up to 210 bits per frame (26 ¼ octets/frame) can be allocated for hidden communication. We named this steganographic method utilizing the principle of frame padding in the physical layer of WLANs with the acronym WiPad (Wireless Padding).
This paper provides an evaluation of througput for this method with the aid of our general, Markov-based model introduced and validated in [10] . This model is in line with the extensions of Bianchi's basic model [2] proposed in [10] and [9] . The essential difference with respect to the latter two is the consideration of the effect of freezing of the stations' backoff timer, as well as the limitation of the number of retransmissions and the maximum size of the contention window, and the impact of transmission errors. Results presented in [10] proved good accuracy of our model in the case of both: error-free and error-prone channels. In either case the proposed model is more accurate than other models presented in literature with which it was compared (including: [1] , [9] and [10] ), most notably, when large numbers of stations are under consideration.
This paper is organized as follows. Next section provides an overview of the state of the art with regard to information hiding techniques that utilize padding in WLANs. Section III contains a description of our method. Section IV is a brief overview of the model presented in [10] and introduces a performance metric for the proposed method. Section V presents a performance analysis of the method based on the given model. Finally, Section VI contains conclusions and suggestions for future work.
II. STATE OF THE ART
Data padding can be found at any layer of the OSI RM, but it is typically exploited for covert communications only in the data link, network and transport layers. Wolf proposed in [13] a steganographic method utilizing padding of 802.3 frames. Its achievable steganographic capacity was maximally 45 bytes/frame. Fisk et al. [2] presented padding of the IP and TCP headers in the context of active wardens. Each of these fields offers up to 31 bits/packet for covert communication. Jankowski et al. in [4] developed a steganographic system, PadSteg, which bases on Ethernet frames' padding and is used in conjunction with ARP (Address Resolution Protocol) and TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) protocols. Padding of IPv6 packets as means for information hiding was described by Lucena et al. in [8] -it offers a couple of channels with a steganographic bandwidth reaching 256 bytes/packet. Steganography for IEEE 802.11 was proposed by Szczypiorski in [12] , who postulated usage of frames with intentionally corrupted checksums to establish covert communication. The system was evaluated by Szczypiorski in [11] . Krätzer et al. in [6] developed a storage channel based scenario (employing header embedding) and a time channel based scenario for IEEE 802.11. In [7] Krätzer et al. reconsidered the approach presented in [6] .
III. THE METHOD IEEE 802.11 a/g standards exploit OFDM at the physical layer. 802.11 network's PHY layer consists of two sublayers: PLCP (PHY Layer Convergance Procedure) and PHY Medium-Dependent (PMD). Selection of a specific transmission data rate at the PHY layer implies functioning with a predefined number of bits corresponding to each OFDM symbol. The number of bits per symbol may vary from 24, for 6 Mbps, up to 216, for 54 Mbps (Table I) . Three fields are liable to padding: SERVICE, PSDU (Physical layer Service Data Unit), TAIL (Fig. 1 ). The lengths of SERVICE and TAIL are constant (16 bits and 6 bits respectively), while the PSDU is a MAC frame and its length varies depending on user data, ciphers and network operation mode (ad hoc vs. infrastructure). For each rate R, the number of bits per symbol can be factorized into primes (Table I) and then, using this knowledge, a least common multiple can be calculated as 2 6 3 3 = 1728. This means that the maximum number of padding bytes (octets) that may be used for all rates is:
where α is a positive integer.
Please note that padding is present in all frames, therefore frames that are more frequently exchanged, like ACKs may become an interesting target for covert communication.
Typically all padding bits are set to zero [3] , but in this paper we assueme that all of them could be used for steganographic purposes. 
IV. THE MODEL

A. Assumptions
We considered saturation conditions: stations have non empty queues and there is always a frame to be sent. The number of stations competing for medium access is n (for n=1 there is one station sending frames to another station which may only reply with an ACK frame). Errors in the transmission medium are fully randomly distributed; this is the worst case scenario in terms of frame error rate -FER. All stations experience the same bit error rate (BER) and all are within each other's transmission range and there are no hidden terminals. Stations communicate in ad hoc mode (BSS -Basic Service Set) with basic access method. Every station employs the same physical layer (PHY). The transmission data rate R is the same and constant for all stations. All frames are of constant length L. The only frames that are exchanged are data frames and ACK frames. Collided frames are discarded -the capture effect [5] is not considered.
B. Saturation throughput S expressed through characteristics of the physical channel
The saturation throughput S is defined as in [1] :
where E[DATA] is the mean value of successfully transmitted payload, and E[T] is the mean value of the duration of the following channel states: T I -idle slot, T S -successful transmission, T C -transmission with collision, T E_DATA -unsuccessful transmission with data frame error, T E_ACK -unsuccessful transmission with ACK error. The relation of the saturation throughput to physical channel characteristics is calculated similarly as in [9] :
where σ is the duration of an idle slot (aSlotTime [3] ) and δ is the propagation delay. For 802.11a/g OFDM PHY ( Fig. 1) :
where:
T symbol -duration of a transmission symbol, 
The saturation throughput S equals:
where L pld is MAC (Medium Access Control) payload size and L pld = L -L MAChdr , where L MAChdr is the size of the MAC header plus the size of a FCS (Frame Checksum Sequence).
The data rate R is defined as:
As a result, saturation throughput S is expressed as a function of τ, p e_data and p e_ACK . In the following sections these probabilities are evaluated.
C. Probability of frame transmission τ
Let s(t) be a random variable describing DCF backoff stage at time t, with values from set {0, 1, 2,…,m}. Let b(t) be a random variable describing the value of the backoff timer at time t, with values from the set {0, 1, 2,…, W i -1}. These random variables are correlated because the maximum value of the backoff timer depends on the backoff stage:
where W 0 is the initial size of the contention window (CW) and m' is (the boundary stage above which the contention widow will not be enlarged further) ; m' can be either greater, smaller or m. W 0 and W m' depend on CW min and CW max [3] : 
The two-dimensional process (s(t), b(t)) will be analyzed with the aid of an embedded Markov chain (steady state probabilities), whose states correspond to the time instants at which the channel state changes. Let (i,k) denote the current state of this process. The conditional, one-step, state transition probabilities will be denoted by
. Let p f be the probability of transmission failure and p coll the probability of collision. The non-null transition probabilities are determined as follows:
Ad (a): The station's backoff timer is decremented from k+1 to k at a fixed, i-th backoff stage, i.e. the station has detected an idle slot. The probability of this event Pr{channel is idle} = 1 -Pr{one or more stations are transmitting}. We consider saturation conditions, so Pr{one or more stations are transmitting} equals p coll .
Ad (b): The station's backoff timer is frozen at a fixed, i-th backoff stage, i.e. the channel is busy. Pr{channel is busy} = Pr{one or more stations are transmitting} = p coll .
Ad (c): The station's backoff timer is changed from 0 to k and the backoff stage reinitialized from i to 0. The probability of this event equals: Pr{transmission is successful and number k was randomly chosen to initiate the backoff timer at stage 0} = Pr{transmission is successful} ⋅ Pr{number k was randomly chosen to initiate the backoff timer at stage 0}. The probability of successful transmission is equal to 1 -p f and the probability that number k was randomly chosen to initiate the backoff timer at stage 0 equals 1/W 0 .
Ad (d): The station's backoff timer is changed from 0 to k and the backoff stage is increased from i-1 to i. Probability of this event equals: Pr{transmission is unsuccessful and number k was randomly chosen to initiate the backoff timer at stage i} = Pr{transmission is unsuccessful} ⋅ Pr{number k was randomly chosen to initiate the backoff timer at stage i}. The probability of unsuccessful transmission equals p f and the probability that number k was randomly chosen to initiate the backoff timer at stage i equals 1/W i .
Ad (e): The station's backoff timer is changed from 0 to k and the backoff stage is changed from m to 0, i.e. the station has reached the maximum retransmission count. The probability of this event equals the probability that number k was randomly chosen to initiate the backoff timer at stage 0, i.e. 1/W 0 .
Let b i,k be the steady-state occupancy probability of state (i,k). It can be shown that: 
we get:
The probability of frame transmission τ is equal to Pr{backoff timer equals 0} and thus:
For p coll = 0 the above solution is the same as presented in [9] .
D. Probability of transmission failure p f and probability of collision p coll
The probability of transmission failure
where p e is the frame error probability:
where p e_data is FER for data frames and p e_ACK is FER for ACK frames. p e_data and p e_ACK can be calculated from bit error probability (i.e. BER), p b : 
E. Capacity and saturation throughput of steganographic channels
Let the capacity of a steganographic channel based on data frames be:
Let the capacity of a steganographic channel based on ACK frames be:
Therefore the saturation throughput of a steganographic channel based on data frames may be defined as:
And, finally, the saturation throughput of a steganographic channel based on ACK frames equals:
V. ANALYSIS
A. Frames with a maximum number of padding octets
All diagrams presented in this section display values of the saturation throughput of the proposed steganographic method (WiPad) based on the data frame variant. All calculations were made for n∈{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10} . For L=214 octet frames (α=1; 186 bytes at IP layer) the following values of BER were used {10 -4 , 10 -5 , 0}, and for L∈{214, 430, 646, 862, 1078, 1294, 1510} octet frames (α∈{1, 2,…, 7}) the correspondent BER∈{10 -4 , 10 -5 , 0}. We considered the IEEE 802.11g -ERP-OFDM i.e. "g"-only mode and a data rate of R=54 Mbps (with an exception for the last diagram, which provides an evaluation of the impact of R on S DATA ). Fig. 3 presents S DATA as a function of n for L=214 octet frames and different values of BER. Along with an increasing value of BER the steganographic throughput, S DATA , declines. The maximum value reaches 1.12 Mbps for BER=0 and n=1. Along with an increasing value of BER the presented curves flatten out. For a given BER, the decrease of S DATA together with an increase of n is related to a growing number of collisions in the medium. The observed decline in the value of S DATA between BER=0 and BER=10 -5 is very small. Fig. 4 presents S DATA as a function of n for different values of frame length and BER=0. For a given n, an increasing frame length leads to a fall in the attainable S DATA . Fig. 5 represents the correlation between S DATA and n, for different values of frame length and BER=10 -5 , while Fig. 6 displays S DATA as a function of n for different frame lengths and BER=10 -4 . Compared to the values obtained for BER=0, we observe a reduction in the value of S DATA due to the influence of channel errors. Finally we evaluate ( Fig. 7 ) S DATA as a function of n for different IEEE 802.11g data rates R∈{6, 9, 12, 18, 24, 36, 48, 54} Mbps. We evaluate ( Fig. 8 ) S ACK as a function of n for different IEEE 802.11g data rates R∈{18, 24, 36, 48, 54} Mbps. For n=1 and R=54, S ACK =0.44 Mbps (82 bits serve as a hidden channel). The throughput for 24 Mbps networks is higher than for 36 Mbps because of the different capacity of the hidden channel: 58 and 10 bits respectively.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we evaluated a new steganographic method called WiPad intended for IEEE 802.11 OFDM networks, whose functioning bases on insertion of bits into the padding of transmission symbols. The analysis for IEEE 802.11g 54 Mbps networks revealed that the capacity of WiPad equals 1.1 Mbit/s for data frames and 0.44 Mbit/s for ACK frames, which gives a total of almost 1.65 Mbit/s. To the authors' best knowledge this is the most capacious of all the known steganographic network channels.
Future work will include WiPad analysis for typical IP packet sizes and the estimation of achievable steganographic bandwidth in case of the IEEE 802.11n standard. Further studies should also involve pinpointing potential detection mechanisms of the proposed communication system.
